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ABStRACt
a well-governed public sector is inconceiv-able without the effective and efficient 
governance of state- and local government-
owned enterprises (in brief state-owned en-
terprises, soEs). by fulfilling its statutory 
obligation, the state audit office of hungary 
(sao) wishes to make its own contribution to 
good governance. the sao put forward rec-
ommendations based on the audit experiences 
of enterprises owned by the state or a local 
government in order to renew public sector 
management. a special example for the utili-
sation of the recommendations is the govern-
ment decision adopted on the renewal of the 
remuneration system of the senior officials of 
enterprises in majority state ownership. in the 
government decision – based on the recom-
mendation of the President of the sao – the 
government proclaimed its commitment to 
developing the conditions for the transparent, 
effective and economically viable operation 
of majority soEs and to the fact that the ac-
tivities of the managers are to be continuously 
evaluated from the aspects of regularity, ef-
fectiveness and economic viability; as well 
as to the fact that the managers of soEs are 
required to abide by stringent ethical and in-
tegrity principles. the objective of this study 
is to support the intention set out in the gov-
ernment decision by sharing the relevant audit 
experiences and giving detailed recommenda-
tions.
IntRODuCtIOn
only well-managed, effectively and ef-ficiently governed state-/local govern-
ment-owned enterprises serve the interest 
of the public. the assets managed by these 
companies are public assets, on the one hand 
their activities and the quality, effectiveness 
and efficiency of their financial management 
contribute to the responsible management of 
public funds, and on the other hand the goods 
and services produced by them affect the 
quality of life, security, health and welfare of 
the population. to what extent does today’s 
hungarian practice ensure the achievability 
of these goals? Do we have to worry about 
the management of state-/local government-
owned enetrprises? are there general corpo-
rate governance problems that may prevent 
these companies from pursuing effective and 
efficient management? What are those key 
management areas where progress can or 
should be made? our study intends to exam-
ine the above questions.
the auditing of state-/local government-
owned enterprises has become a relatively 
new, but increasingly important area of audits 
of state audit office of hungary (sao). al-
though act XXXViii of 1989 on the state au-
dit office already provided for the auditability 
of state-owned enterprises, the auditability of 
local government-owned enterprises was only 
made possible by a legislative amendment ef-
fective as of 1th January 2011. the sao audits 
of state-/local government-owned enterprises 
revealed serious, corporate governance relat-
ed problems. for example:
the improper management of certain 
larger companies that may place consider-
able burden on the budget or may bring the 
affected local government city to the edge 
of insolvency; 
reductions in assets hidden as dis-
guised debt;
S t u D y  S e r I e S
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high bonuses paid to the management 
of a company generating losses of tens of 
billions;
accounting deficiencies rendering 
sound management impossible;
contracts failed to be updated referring 
still  to legal regulations that were effective 
19 years ago;
 unrealistically low asset management 
fees, etc.
the state audit office of hungary made 
recommendations on the renewal of corporate 
governance in public sector based on the audit 
experiences of state- and local government-
owned enterprises. as a result, the government 
declared in a decision2 its commitment to estab-
lishing transparent, effective and economically 
viable operating conditions for state-owned 
enterprises, and to the continuous performance 
assessment of the managers of state-owned 
enterprises from the aspects of regularity, ef-
fectiveness and economy; and furthermore, to 
the fact that the managers of state-owned enter-
prises are required to abide by stringent ethical 
and integrity principles (sao, 2015).
the objective of this study is to support 
the intention set out in the government deci-
sion by identifying the system-level corporate 
governance problems of state-/local govern-
ment-owned enterprises and by giving detailed 
recommendations after having considered the 
effective legal environment and the recommen-
dations for good practices outlined in the lit-
erature.3 furthermore, our aim is to incentivise 
the professionals to discuss our recommenda-
tions given for the renewal of corporate gov-
ernance in the public sector and to encourage 
them to contribute with their knowledge and 
experiences to the development of good public 
management.
in the first chapter of the study we wish to 
place the issue and key actors of the corporate 
governance of state-/local government-owned 
enterprises. in the second chapter, we intend to 
analyse the recommendations given in relation 
to the corporate governance of state-/local gov-
ernment-owned enterprises by reviewing the 
related literature. in the third chapter, by a le-
gal analysis of the effective hungarian legisla-
tions applicable to the corporate governance of 
state-/local government-owned enterprises we 
intend to support our hypothesis that the effec-
tive corporate governance model established by 
the laws is in line with the recommendations 
of the literature, however, the model is more 
like a framework, and the substantive content 
is expected to be added by those managing the 
systems. in the fourth chapter, we present our 
arguments for the necessity of the renewal of 
corporate governance in public sector by mak-
ing references to the societal and economic 
importance of state-/local government-owned 
enterprises and to the system-level problems 
uncovered by the comparative analysis of 
sao audits. in the fifth chapter, we present 
our recommendations given for the enhancing 
of corporate governance in public sector cat-
egorised by the main actors: ownership entity, 
supervisory board and management. We close 
our study by emphasising the importance of the 
role played by audits in the renewal of public 
management. 
2  Government Decision No. 1660/2015. (IX. 15.) on the Renewal of the Remuneration System of the Senior Officers of Business Association in 
Majority State Ownership.
3  This study is not intended to analyse what economic functions the state or the local governments should be entrusted with.
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1. mEtHOD Of AnAlYSIS
in our study we assess the recommendations given for the corporate governance of state- 
and local government-owned enterprises by re-
lying on the international literature, with partic-
ular regard to papers published by international 
organisations and consulting companies. We 
carry out a legal analysis for reviewing the effec-
tive hungarian regulations on the corporate gov-
ernance of state- and local government-owned 
enterprises, which are compared to the recom-
mendations found in international literature. We 
present the practice of corporate governance 
of the state- and local government-owned en-
terprises by carrying out descriptive statistical 
analysis of the experiences published in the 113 
audit reports prepared by the state audit office 
of hungary (sao), and by identifying areas of 
concern. We will put forward our recommenda-
tions on the renewal of the corporate governance 
of state- and local government-owned enterpris-
es based on the comparison of the recommenda-
tions found in international literature and prob-
lems associated with the corporate governance 
of state- and local government-owned enterpris-
es outlined in the analysis of sao reports.
Key actors of the corporate governance of state-/local government-owned enterprises
figure 1
Source: own editing
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2. tHE COnCEPt 
Of PuBlIC SECtOR 
mAnAGEmEnt
one of the key measures of good govern-ance is the method, by which the state de-
velops and operates its institutional system for 
fulfilling its societal role and its service provider 
functions. the ultimate goal of this set-up is the 
effective, efficient and accountable performance 
of public functions by the cost-efficient use of 
available resources. the concept of public man-
agement includes all those planning, organising, 
management and monitoring activities that are 
necessary for the development and operation of 
an institutional system ensuring the fulfilment 
of state functions.
our study is focused on a sub-field of public 
management. its aim is to analyse what the best 
method is to ensure that those involved in the gov-
ernance of state- and local government-owned 
enterprises perform effective and efficient man-
agement in the manner best serving the public 
good with respect to community assets entrust-
ed to them for the purposes of public service, 
and which are ultimately owned by the citizens 
of a country. for the purpose of our analysis, the 
concept of the corporate governance of state-/lo-
cal government-owned enterprises includes the 
exercise of rights and fulfilment of obligations 
performed on the one hand by the ownership en-
tity or by the bodies assigned by them (typically 
supervisory board), and performed on the other 
hand by the managing directors or supreme bod-
ies (board of directors) responsible for the op-
eration of state-owned companies, hereinafter 
referred to as management (see Figure 1).
3. GOOD PuBlIC 
mAnAGEmEnt: 
An OvERvIEW
theories, analyses, foreign good practices and international recommendations may 
help find the answers to challenges encountered 
in relation to the corporate governance of state-/
local government-owned enterprises.
the specialists of economics and manage-
ment studies have long been interested in the 
question in what way the highest level of eco-
nomic prosperity, effectiveness and profitability 
can be achieved at national economy’s level or 
at individual companies’ level. it has long been 
known that the institutional environment, i.e. the 
legislative, organisational and cultural condi-
tions and the resulting circumstances are of key 
relevance for economic performance both at the 
level of the national economy and of corpora-
tions (Coase, 1937; North, 1961). in addition to 
those listed above, the prosperity of a company 
is determined by the performance of its manag-
ers. When looking at the elements of this per-
formance, management studies usually inden-
tify four management-related functions (see for 
example Bartol and Martin, 1991). 
1. Planning: goal setting, determining the 
frameworks and direction of an activity and 
allocating the assets to the targets.
2. Organisation: assignment of tasks, phys-
ical and human assets to one another with a 
view to making the related tasks achievable 
and effectively completed.
3. Management: incentivising, supporting, 
enforcing and influencing people, so that 
they can accomplish the goals set and can 
achieve the desired performance.
4. Monitoring: continuous measurement of 
the goals against the results achieved, taking 
the necessary actions in case of deviations to 
ensure completion or for readapting the re-
lated goals.
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although management studies do not have a 
single, universally applicable formula guaran-
teeing the best solutions, nevertheless, it is es-
sentially important that all managers should be 
aware of the above mentioned four functions.
the effective performance of the above 
mentioned four functions is indispensible in 
public management. Each of the recommenda-
tions found in the literature on public manage-
ment to be reviewed hereunder may be linked to 
one of these four functions.
however, before we would proceed to pre-
senting these recommendations, we find it im-
portant to emphasise that a consistent approach 
may be the best method to effectuate the effec-
tive and efficient management of state- and lo-
cal government-owned enterprises. as a matter 
of fact, their duties, management-related chal-
lenges and operating environment are basically 
the same: all these companies are expected to 
serve the public, they are to face the same type 
of conflicts of interest and challenges arising 
from the roles of the ownership entity, the su-
pervisory board and the management, and all 
these companies operate in the same societal 
and economic environment.4,5 the joint discus-
sion of the issues related to the corporate gov-
ernance of state- and local government-owned 
enterprises is a general practice in the related 
documents of the international organisations. 
the oEcD analyses and recommendations also 
commonly treat all those companies as soEs, 
which are recognised by the laws of the given 
country as enterprises, and in which the state 
exercises proprietary rights by effectively su-
pervising the operation of these companies by 
holding the majority or a predominant minor-
ity of the voting rights. in their case, the term 
“state” may refer to any entity holding public 
authority (for example, the central government, 
local and county governments, public adminis-
tration bodies), as well as companies entitled 
by those above to exercise the owner’s rights 
(for example holding companies, asset manag-
ers) (oEcD, 2015a). a similar approach is ap-
plied by commission Directive 80/723/EEc on 
the transparency of financial relations between 
member states and public undertakings, which 
applies the term public undertaking to all under-
takings, “over which the state and the regional 
(or local) public authorities may exercise direct-
ly or indirectly a dominant influence by virtue 
of their ownership of it, their financial partici-
pation therein, or the rules which govern them”. 
the strategic document focusing on the corpo-
rate governance of state-owned enterprises pub-
lished by Pwc’s Public sector research centre 
does not distinguish between state- and local 
government-owned enterprises as far as public 
management is concerned (Pwc, 2015).6
the oEcD analysis (oEcD, 2015a), by uti-
lising the experiences gained from the consul-
tations carried out with the member states, has 
put forward detailed recommendations for the 
corporate governance of soEs – we emphasize 
again that the oEcD analysis does not distin-
guish between state- and local government-
owned entities – with a view to making their 
operation more effective, efficient, transparent 
and accountable. the recommendations pro-
vide guidance primarily for governments and 
for ownership entities, so that these bodies can 
avoid the problems arising from passive own-
ership or excessive state intervention while ex-
ercising their ownership rights. the corporate 
governance of state- and privately owned enter-
4  The similarities are also emphasised by Domokos (2015), who suggests that the criteria set out in the government decision on the appointment of 
the managers of state-owned companies could also be reasonably applied to local government-owned companies.
5  Hereunder, unless there is a need to distinguish between companies in state and local government ownership, the terms state- owned enterprises 
(SOEs) will be used as synonyms for state-/local government-owned enterprises.
6  The World Bank puts forward its recommendations for narrowly-defined state-owned enterprises. However, it notes that the recommendations set 
out in its document may also have positive influence on the performance of other publicly owned enterprises, such as local government-owned 
enterprises (World Bank, 2014, page 28) 
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prises raise similar challenges to some extent, 
therefore, according to the oEcD, the recom-
mendations given for private companies may 
also prevail when applied to the renewal of the 
corporate governance of soEs.7
the oEcD organises its recommendations 
around seven topics: 
1. recommendations underlining the owner-
ship function of the state.
2. recommendations addressing the owner-
ship function of the state.
3. recommendations related to the market 
behaviour of soEs.
4. recommendations related to the equal 
treatment of private co-owners and inves-
tors.
5. recommendations addressing the rela-
tionships with stakeholders and to respon-
sible business.
6. recommendations related to disclosure 
and transparency.
7. recommendations related to the responsi-
bilities of the board of directors and supervi-
sory boards of soEs.
the oEcD gives highly detailed recommen-
dations in relation to certain issues. for reasons 
of limited space, we will only discuss a few 
of these hereunder. according to the oEcD’s 
recommendation, the state must use its owner-
ship role for serving the public good. for this 
purpose, state must clarify, or must review at 
regular intervals why she finds reasonable to 
maintain state ownership in a given case, and 
what public policy goal she aims to achieve by 
state ownership. in addition, she must define 
its owner’s policy, in which she declares her 
role played in governance, as well as the rules 
and responsibilities of those involved in the ex-
ecutive tasks.
the corporate governance of state-owned 
enterprises should be active, professional and 
effective, similarly to that of privately owned 
peers. the state should give full operation 
autonomy to the managements of her compa-
nies for the achievements of the goals set, and 
should refrain from interfering in the manage-
ment activities. the ownership entity must 
have appropriate capacity and competence for 
performing its duties effectively. in addition to 
establishing an adequate incentive scheme, the 
state must define the goals to be achieved by 
the company, including the financial and asset-
related goals and a tolerable risk level, and the 
achievement of these must be monitored.
the legal and regulatory environment must 
ensure equal conditions for the state- and pri-
vately owned companies by guaranteeing fair 
competition. to ensure this, the proprietary and 
regulatory responsibilities of the state must be 
separated. if a state-owned company has pri-
vate owners as well, it must be ensured that 
they are given equal treatment and have access 
to company data. in addition, if a state-owned 
company enters into a private-public partner-
ship, the contracting party must ensure that the 
rights conferred by the contract are maintained. 
the state, the ownership entities and the soEs 
must respect the rights of the stakeholders as 
specified by law or the agreement.
soEs and their governance must be trans-
parent and must meet the accounting, disclo-
sure, compliance and audit standards of private 
companies. the reports prepared by soEs must 
include the following, amongst others for the 
purpose of their regular monitoring, measuring 
the performance of those involved in their gov-
ernance and of informing the wider public:
material financial and other data rele-
vant for their activities, such as their goals 
and the achievement thereof,
financial and operating incomes, in-
cluding the costs and coverage of public 
sector duties fulfilled,
the remuneration of the company’s 
managers, the qualification of the senior of-
ficers and their selection procedure,
7  The recommendations applicable to privately owned enterprises can be found in the OECD (2015b).
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foreseeable risks and the actions taken 
for their management,
financial assistance and guarantees re-
ceived from the state. 
reports comparable across companies and 
time must be disclosed and must be subjected to 
independent, external audits.
in addition to putting forward recommenda-
tions, the oEcD prepared an overview (oEcD, 
2011) on the trends observed in the coprorate 
governance of soEs operating in the member 
states. increase in transparency and disclosure 
(switzerland, turkey, germany, sweden and 
New zealand) and the specification of selec-
tion and employment principles with respect to 
managers (czech republic, finland, Norway 
and sweden) were seen as general trends in the 
past years. according to the oEcD study, the 
centralisation of ownership roles and the en-
hancement of transparency and accountability 
were clearly observable in the years following 
the global economic crisis. a special focus area 
was the revision of the rules and procedures 
pertinent to the appointment, functioning and 
remuneration of senior officers and bodies ef-
fectuated with a view to limiting the political 
influence on the operation of the companies and 
ensuring high professional performance in the 
management of the companies.
strong overlap is indicated between the rec-
ommendations given by the World bank in rela-
tion to the corporate governance of soEs (World 
bank, 2014) and the recommendations put for-
ward by the oEcD (oEcD, 2015a). the World 
bank document is enriched by practical exam-
ples gathered from many parts of the world.
Pwc, an advisory company, organised its 
recommendations around four key words in its 
study analysing the management of state-owned 
companies (Pwc, 2015).8 (1) the goal to be 
achieved by the state-owned company must be 
clarified, as well as the method, by which the 
company can reach it. (2) adequate resources 
and time must be committed for achieving prop-
er governance. (3) managers must have adequate 
capabilities and experiences for the governance 
of state-owned companies. (4) managers com-
mitted to integrity are needed, who are able to 
serve citizens in a manner creating public added 
value.
8  4Cs: Clarity, Capacity, Capability and Commitment.
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4. REGulAtIOn
Of tHE GOvERnAnCE 
Of StAtE- AnD lOCAl 
GOvERnmEnt-OWnED 
EntERPRISES In 
HunGARY
there is a high number of legislations af-fecting the corporate governance of state-
owned enterprises in hungary. at a general 
level, the responsibilities and powers associated 
with the roles of key importance from the aspect 
of governing enterprises, such as the owners of 
enterprises (members), senior officers and the 
supervisory board, are regulated by the civil 
code9 without making any distinction between 
private and public ownership. however, the 
civil code, in harmony with its focus on private 
life, only regulates the main frameworks related 
to the management of companies, and leaves the 
details to be specified primarily by the owners 
of enterprises (members, shareholders).
in terms of state-owned enterprises, act cX-
cVi of 2011 on National assets provides for the 
criteria of responsible financial management, 
for the transparent, effective and cost-efficient 
operation of assets and for maintaining or en-
hancing the value of the same. act cXXii of 
2009 providing for the mandatory establishment 
of supervisory boards, for the minimum and 
maximum number of the members in a board 
of directors and in a supervisory board, for the 
maximum level of their remuneration and for 
the mandatory disclosure of the related informa-
tion, is also related to the corporate governance 
of state-owned enterprises. another related le-
gal regulation is the government decision on the 
renewal of the remuneration system of the sen-
ior officers of business association in majority 
state ownership incentivising profitable finan-
cial management by prohibiting the payment of 
manager bonuses in case of loss-making finan-
cial management.
the transparent operation of publicly owned 
companies is further enhanced by act c of 2000 
on accounting, which finds it indispensible that 
objective information must be made available 
on the asset, financial, profit situation, and the 
trends thereof, of business entities. in addition, 
it also specifies accounting rules, on the basis of 
which true and fair account and information can 
be provided on the revenue generating capacity, 
assets, development of assets, financial situation 
and future plans of those falling under the scope 
of this legislation. a provision of act cXii of 
2011 on the right of informational self-deter-
mination and on freedom of information pro-
viding for the disclosure of data on state- and 
local government-owned assets for public inter-
est is also aimed at focusing on the transparent 
management of state- and local government-
owned enterprises. the scope of public data is 
further extended by act cVi of 2007 on state 
Property.
government Decree 370/2011 (Xii. 31.) on 
the internal control system and on the internal 
audit of central budgetary institutions provid-
ing for the establishment, operation and devel-
opment of an adequate control environment, 
risk management system, control activities, as 
well as communication and monitoring systems, 
thus promoting regular, effective and efficient 
management, is also related to the governance 
of state-owned enterprises linked to the govern-
ment sector.10
as for the exercise of proprietary rights, 
the act on state Property provides for the ob-
ligation to maintain records on and to properly 
utilise state property. in addition to the legal 
9  Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code of Hungary
10  The Ministry for National Economy of Hungary prepared guidelines for the establishment of an internal control system. See: http://
ngmszakmaiteruletek.kormany.hu/belso-kontrollrendszer 
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provisions, mNV zrt.11, as the entity authorised 
to exercise the owner’s rights of a number of 
state-owned enterprises, has put forward highly 
detailed corporate governance recommenda-
tions and suggestions incorporating the relevant 
oEcD recommendations and enterprise and 
stock market practices.12 for the purpose of pro-
moting the integrity of companies falling within 
the portfolio managed by mNV zrt., the state 
entity recommends the application of its own 
code of Ethics (mNV, 2013).
as for the strategic governance of local gov-
ernment-owned enterprises, another important 
legislation is act cLXXXiX of 2011 on Local 
governments in hungary, which provides that 
the long-term development concepts of the rep-
resentative councils of the local governments are 
required to be outlined in economic programmes 
or development plans. the development con-
cepts for ensuring certain public services and 
for improving the standards of the same must 
be included in these economic programmes or 
development plans.
in addition to general regulations, the effec-
tive sectoral legislations (for example act XViii 
of 2005 on District heating services, act cciX 
of 2011 on Water Public utility services and 
act cLXXXV of 2012 on Waste) put it forward 
as a general principle that enterprises providing 
public services are expected to perform sustain-
able and cost-effective management.
When comparing the recommendations with 
the effective regulations on the management and 
operation of state-owned companies, it can be 
stated that the frameworks laid down in the ef-
fective hungarian regulations, and the guidance 
put forward by the entity exercising proprietary 
rights show similarities and in many cases are 
in harmony with the international recommenda-
tions. however, as we explain in the next sec-
tions, according to the sao audit experiences 
the governance practices of state- and local 
government-owned enterprises in several cases 
fail to comply with the legal provisions, or fail 
to fill in the legal frameworks with substantive 
contents incentivising for effective, efficient and 
transparent management.
11  Hungarian National Asset Management Inc.
12  The recommendation issued for state-owned enterprises also acknowledges that the effective and transparent corporate governance of companies 
falling under the scope of state-owned, or more generally publicly owned companies, has been an increasing societal expectation in Hungary 
(MNV, 2014).
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5. WHAt mAKES 
tHE REnEWAl Of 
PuBlIC mAnAGEmEnt 
nECESSARY?
state-owned enterprises play an impor-tant role in the national economy. their 
societal role is also indispensible, as almost 
all citizens encounter their (public) services 
on a daily basis, for which citizens pay con-
siderable amounts directly or indirectly. the 
effective and efficient governance of, and the 
protection and enhancement of the assets of 
state-owned enterprises are on the one hand 
considered as basic public interest, and on the 
other hand represent large responsibility and 
challenge. the necessity for renewing public 
management, as we will see hereunder, arises 
from the joint effects of two factors, name-
ly, the societal and economic importance of 
state-owned enterprises and their many prob-
lems and shortcomings detected by the sao 
audits.
5.1 Increasing Importance, 
Increasing Challenges
the economic importance of soEs is considerable both in the developed and 
in the developing countries. according to 
Christiansen (2011)  in the oEcD member 
countries the majority of central governments 
owned dozens of enterprises (see Figure 2). 
in this respect, hungary is at the top of the 
list, while spain ranking as second owning 
less than half of the number of soEs when 
compared to the hungarian fi gures.13
in terms of the proportion of those em-
ployed in enterprises owned by the central 
13  The fact that the referred study only published partial data for Poland somewhat might modify our evaluation.According to data data 
approximately 600 companies owned by Polish government operated in Poland at the time of the research. We note that the numbers of companies 
might be fairly volatile in time, as for example in the case of organisational changes, such as mergers or demergers, the number of state-owned 
enterprises operating in a country may be reduced to a fraction or may be multiplied in a relatively short time.
Number of enterprises in the majority ownership of the central government in 2009 
 (pcs)
figure 2
Source: Christiansen (2011)
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government in the oEcD countries, hungary 
ranked as third, behind Norway and Estonia, 
in 2009 (see Figure 3). in the case of hun-
gary, it meant that the enterprises owned by 
the central government alone had more than 
150,000 employees in 2009, in other words, in 
the hungarian labour market every 25th em-
ployee was employed by a state-owned enter-
prises. by comparing the number of the enter-
prises and the employment weights it can be 
also established that the size of the enterprises 
owned by the hungarian central government 
is relatively small than their counterparts op-
erating in other oEcD member states. on the 
one hand it is explained by the fact that in most 
Eu member states soEs have been organised 
in holding companies, therefore, there are less 
enterprises which have a higher number of 
employees on average. on the other hand, in 
these countries the majority of companies are 
owned by the local governments or the prov-
inces, which were not included in these data.
compared to the situation in 2009, both 
the number of state-owned and the number 
of local government-owned companies have 
increased in hungary. as part of the change 
in economic policy introduced in 2010, to-
day natural monopolies (such as gas, elec-
tricity, water supply, waste management) are 
ultimateley owned by either the central or lo-
cal. the (increased) volume of public assets 
serving economic purposes sets a number of 
challenges both from the aspect of ownership 
and governance requiring actions from public 
management setup.
Financial challenge is set by the need 
to provide the funds required to acquire prop-
erty, which affects the central or local budget. 
in addition, the funding of the investments of 
state-owned enterprises, and potentially the 
figure 3 
Number of employees employed by central government-owned enterprises  
(% of total employment in 2009)
Source: Christiansen (2011)
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required owner’s guarantee, is provided from 
the central budget, with particular regard to 
those cases, where market funding or Eu 
funding is not available due to the scale of the 
projects or the nature of the investment (see 
for example Paks nuclear plant project). Not 
least, the potentially required capital replace-
ment of state-owned enterprises may present 
funding needs.
Professional challenge is raised by the 
fact that the high standards of the goods and 
services provided by the state-owned enter-
prises and the fulfilment of expanding man-
agement and proprietary roles require ad-
equate competences that are to be acquired by 
the public sector by competing with private 
companies in the labour market. 
Ethical challenge is set by the expand-
ing interface where private and public sectors 
meet resulting in increased corruption risks, 
provided that all other factors remain un-
changed.14
5.2 Audit Experiences of 
the State Audit Office of 
Hungary in Relation to 
State-owned Enterprises
in the period 2011–2015, the number of sao audits investigating state-/local government-
owned enterprises kept increasing year by year 
(see Figure 4). although the audits primarily fo-
cused on the financial situation, asset manage-
ment, structure of the internal control system of 
the companies, as well as the regularity of the 
inherent fields of the above, we can put forward 
system-level findings in relation to the corporate 
governance of soEs by comparative analysis of 
the related audit reports.
in the period under review, 113 sao audit 
reports were prepared in relation to the audits of 
state-/local government-owned enterprises oper-
ating in different sectors. the following entities 
14  An example for the expansion of interface between the private and public sectors is the case of experts involved in EU tenders by public 
institutions. The involved experts were not expected to meet the same ethical criteria that had been set for public servants according to the integrity 
survey conducted by the SAO (Pulay, 2015).
Number of audits conducted by the State Audit Office of Hungary  
investigating state-/local government-owned enterprises
figure 4
Source: Authors’ calculation based on SAO audit reports
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were amongst the audited enterprises: 35 district 
heating companies, 17 theatres, 22 forestries, 9 
waste management companies, 6 transport com-
panies, 5 waterworks, and 19 other enterprises 
operating in the financial, infrastructural, other 
service sectors and ownership entities authorised 
to exercise proprietary rights (see Figure 5).
the increasing number of the recommenda-
tions given in the sao reports and the addressees 
therein from year to year (see Figure 6) indicates 
that there are still lots to improve in the manage-
ment of public assets. there are lots of things to 
be improved in the case of state-owned enter-
prises, too. for example, in relation to the audit-
ing of state-owned enterprises, the sao put for-
ward the following number of recommendations 
requiring mandatory actions: in the case of the 
36 district heating and waste management com-
panies 186 recommendations, in the case of the 
theatres 94 recommendations, 87 recommenda-
tions for the forestries and 42 recommendations 
for public water supply companies. the recom-
mendations requiring mandatory measures are 
primarily intended to ensure the regular operation 
of state- and local government-owned enterprises 
by orientating the affected entities to integrate 
the recommendations in the working practices of 
state- and local government-owned enterprises 
by eliminating irregularities, shortcomings and 
inadequate practices detected in the corporate 
governance of the audited enterprises.
We identified the following issues as recur-
ring problems in the corporate governance of 
state-owned enterprises based on the findings 
and recommendations set out in the 113 sao 
audit reports, and based on the studies of Hor-
váth and Szilas (2015) and of Németh, Jakovác 
and Várpalotai (2015).
Lack of established performance 
requirements. in the case of the three quarters 
of the 36 local government-owned waste man-
agement and district heating companies the busi-
ness plan did not include any set of criteria or in-
dicators suitable for measuring the economy and 
effectiveness of their professional performance. 
this is a problem, because without performance 
requirements, the goal aimed to be achieved and 
the effect to be exerted become unclear, effective-
Distribution of the audits conducted by the State Audit Office of Hungary  
investigating state-/local government-owned enterprises (2011–2015)
figure 5
Sources: Authors’ calculation based on SAO audit reports
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ness and efficiency will be unmeasurable and ac-
countability will be rendered impossible.
Lack of business plans and short-
comings in the contents thereof. business 
plans are important documents for companies 
that are intended to set out the goals expected to 
be achieved by the companies through their ac-
tivities and management, and at the same time 
represent reference points for the related assess-
ments. although the audited 36 waste manage-
ment and district heating companies prepared 
their respective business plans for the year 2012, 
with the exception of five undertakings, howev-
er, considerable differences were found with re-
spect to the contents and the level of detail of 
such business plans. only one local government, 
acting as owner, specified expectations in rela-
tion to the business plan. the comparability of 
the revenue and expenditure data included in the 
business plans and reports was limited by the 
fact that the audited companies failed to ade-
quately separate their activities, and as far as the 
budgeting of was concerned, certain companies 
budgeted the subsidy, while others indicated the 
necessary amount of subsidy in their budgeted 
deficit amounts. only ten companies gave ac-
counts on the implementation of the business 
plans and on variances from the revenue and ex-
penditure expectations. and only five compa-
nies out of the ten included performance indica-
tors in their business plans. While 23 companies 
did not have a set of criteria suitable for measur-
ing performance or any relevant requirements.
Non-compliant cost calculation 
and unjustified pricing. the auditing of the 
fkf zrt.15, the transport companies, district 
Number of recommendations requiring mandatory measures and their addressees (2012‒2014)
figure 6
Source: Authors’ calculation based on annual SAO reports
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heating companies, waste management compa-
nies and theatres detected irregularities and 
shortcomings related to prime cost calculation. 
Without appropriate cost calculation, neither 
full compliance with the regulations defined by 
the act on accounting, nor the complete fulfil-
ment of management and supervisory functions 
(such as planning, pricing, cost analysis, effi-
ciency measurement and monitoring) can be 
expected. the detected shortcomings in cost 
calculation rendered it impossible to judge 
whether the prices and fees paid for public 
services are or were in harmony with the ex-
penditures of the companies related to the pro-
vision of public services, and whether the 
households were burdened to the smallest pos-
sible extent, but suitable for preserving public 
assets and for improving the standards of the 
services. the unfoundedness of the pricing of 
public services is further confirmed by the fact 
that in the less capital intensive waste shipment 
sector, in the case of the audited 9 service pro-
viders the highest service fee was 2.5 times 
higher than the lowest service fee in 2012.
Shortcomings in the protection 
and enhancement of public assets. the au-
dits of the state audit office revealed that in 
case of certain local government-owned enter-
prises the replacement of assets exceeding the 
level of amortisation failed to be effectuated, 
which led to hidden indebtedness. on the other 
hand, in many cases business plans did not in-
clude calculations underlining the capital ex-
penditures. Whereas, in the absence of these, 
sound decisions cannot be made with respect to 
the replacement or enhancement of the assets. 
moreover, the audits also detected shortcom-
ings in the accounting records of assets and 
their justification by inventories. the audits of 
water public utilities and forestries also re-
vealed shortcomings in the updating of asset 
management contracts, as a consequence of 
which, for example forestries paid unrealisti-
cally low charges to mNV zrt. for the areas 
they used.
Shortcomings in proprietary con-
trol and in the exercise of supervisory 
rights. one of the guarantees for accountabil-
ity, responsible public spending and asset man-
agement is the appropriate exercise of owner-
ship rights and tight ownership control. at the 
same time, the audits of water public utility 
companies revealed that the entity exercising 
the ownership rights did not require calcula-
tions underlining capital expenditures, and 
failed to control the preservation and enhance-
ment of assets. the situation was similar in the 
case of companies in majority local govern-
ment ownership, where the internal controls of 
the local governments typically did not con-
tribute to regular fulfilment and to the preser-
vation of assets.
Lack of active governance beyond 
the level of statutory obligations. under 
the rule of law it is a basic requirement for 
those involved in the corporate governance of 
state-/local government-owned enterprises to 
comply with the statutory obligations. this is a 
necessary, but in itself insufficient condition 
for serving the public good. as we explained it 
earlier, legislations typically provide a frame-
work for the governance of companies, which 
must be filled up with substantive contents by 
those involved in management tasks to enable 
the company to serve the interest of the com-
munity as effectively and efficiently as possi-
ble and to achieve the strategic goals set. the 
audits of the state audit office of hungary re-
vealed that it is typical of the corporate govern-
ance of state-owned enterprises that the owner-
ship entity, the supervisory board and the 
management primarily strives to meet the man-
datory legal requirements and they are less in-
terested in adding to their activities any addi-
tional active management instruments 
supp le menting the statutory requirements of 
the applicable laws.
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6. RECOmmEnDAtIOnS 
fOR tHE REnEWAl Of 
PuBlIC mAnAGEmEnt
the societal and economic importance of state-owned enterprises, as well as the 
management-related problems and shortcom-
ings detected based on the summary of the 
sao audits necessitate the renewal of public 
management. to make their operation more 
effective and efficient, and ultimately to be 
recognised by the public as providing higher 
standard services, the concerted renewal of 
the proprietary, proprietary representative and 
management roles responsible for their gov-
ernance is required. it is achievable by way 
of a coordinated renewal process that the in-
dividual management responsibilities form an 
incentive system ensuring the preservation and 
enhancement of public assets and the produc-
tion of affordable and high standard (public) 
services and products in a sustainable manner 
to the satisfaction of the public, in addition to 
the responsible and cost-effective use of pub-
lic funds. (See Figure 7)
in the forthcoming sections, we wish to 
give an overview of our recommendations 
affecting proprietary, proprietary representa-
tive and management roles.16 by presenting 
the recommendations we wish to provide the 
possibility for the experts and workshops to 
discuss those. We believe that the implemen-
tation of our audit-based recommendations 
would result in considerable progress in many 
currently poorly functioning areas and would 
support the establishment of an effectively, 
efficiently and expediently functioning pub-
lic management. in addition, we hope that the 
experts and workshops will also make their 
contributions to the achievement of good gov-
ernance by proposing further aspects and rec-
ommendations.
Aspects to be considered for the renewal of the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises
figure 7
Source: self-editing
Entity exercising proprietary rights
● Owner’s strategy
● Determination of corporate strategies
●  Specification of performance requirements
● Active ownership role
● Consequence-based evaluation
● management selection procedure
● Disclosure policy, transparency
● Efficient exercise of ownership rights
management
● Owner, good master
● Planning and performance indicators
● Reliance on decision support systems
● Accountability, transparency
● Prudent social responsibility
● Integrity and “conflict of interest” rules
Supervisory Board
● thematic audits
● Reports
● Preparedness
16 In relation to our recommendations further considerations can be found in Domokos et al. (2016).
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6.1 Recommendations 
Related to Ownership Roles 
1.  the ownership entity should regularly review 
and disclose those public policy targets that 
justify the state ownership of the affected 
companies.
2.  the ownership entity should set strate-
gic goals for each individual company and 
should define their mission.
3.  the ownership entity must specify clear per-
formance requirements for the management 
operating the company and for the supervi-
sory board.
4.  the entity exercising the ownership rights 
must act as a well-informed and actively in-
volved proprietor. the performance of the 
management and of the supervisory board 
must be evaluated regularly. this evaluation 
must have an effect on the operation of the 
management and the supervisory board, and 
on the remuneration and on the mandates of 
those involved in the above tasks.
5.  the ownership entity should select the mem-
bers of the management and the supervisory 
board based on their previous professional 
performance, capabilities and their commit-
ment to public service.
6.  for the attraction and retention of qualified 
managers capable of achieving challenging 
performance targets and of operating en-
terprises in an effective and efficient man-
ner, management remunerations should be 
aligned to the level prevalent in the market. 
the fulfilment of the required performance 
and quality criteria is an essential require-
ment and is not subject to bonus payment.
7.  the ownership entity should perform its ac-
tivities in a transparent manner, accessible 
by the greater public. it should define trans-
parency rules related to its own operation, 
and to the operation of the management and 
the supervisory board and the scope of pub-
licly available data.
8.  the state and the local governments should 
develop an effective method for their exer-
cising the proprietary rights.
state-owned enterprises can fulfil their soci-
etal and economic roles effectively, only if their 
owners clarify to the general public the public 
policy goals set for and strategy to be followed 
by such companies, and if clear performance 
requirements, understood by the management, 
are determined. the entities exercising the own-
ership rights may facilitate the achievement of 
the requirements by employing highly qualified 
managers, by continuously monitoring and as-
sessing the results, and by ensuring transpar-
ency, i.e. the power of the public eye.
for the improvement of public management, 
the method of performing ownership tasks 
should also be reconsidered. Due to the high 
number of the companies (see Figure 2), it is a 
real challenge for the state and any local govern-
ment having a large company portfolio to ensure 
proper awareness and active cooperation, since 
these require the availability of appropriate level 
and standard of competence. accordingly, it is 
reasonable to consider the establishment of a 
new public management structure, concentrat-
ing management knowledge and being in har-
mony with the international experiences, which 
would be responsible for preparing strategic di-
rections and decisions, for the evaluation of the 
implementation thereof according to consistent 
principles and for the development of an assess-
ment methodology (see Figure 8).
6.2 Recommendations Related 
to the Supervisory Board 
9.    in order to promote the interests of the owners, 
the members of the supervisory board must 
regularly verify that the company working 
under their supervision and its management 
operate regularly, and that the company’s 
reports include credible and reliable infor-
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mation. Within this framework, they must 
carry out thematic audits, in particular for 
the purpose of utilising the indications given 
by the internal control, and with respect to 
the performance requirements defined by 
the owner and regarding compliance with 
the disclosure policy.
10.  the supervisory board must regularly report 
to the owner on the results of their audits and 
inspections by assuming full responsibility 
for their contents.
11.  the members of the supervisory board must 
have such competence and experience that 
guarantees the monitoring of the implemen-
tation of the owner’s interests, the ability to 
understand the operation of the companies 
entrusted to their supervision and to recog-
nise any possible irregularities.
the supervisory board is basically an or-
ganisation established for enforcing the own-
er’s interests, which performs its duties effec-
tively, if it actively monitors the operation of 
the management and the company, and makes 
sure that credible information are included in 
the company’s reports, monitors the imple-
mentation of the disclosure policy, and informs 
the owner about its experiences. however, its 
performance can only be comprehensive, if 
it does not only have a complex image of the 
company’s performance, but it is aware of all 
those processes, events, risks emerged that 
may affect the company’s operation in compli-
ance with external and internal rules, as well 
as its profitability and assets. it can only meet 
its diverse tasks by possessing the appropriate 
competencies.
Portfolio management system 
figure 8
Source: self-editing
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6.3 Recommendations 
Related to the management 
12.  the managers of soEs must work as good 
masters being committed to public service, 
abiding by the rules and budget frameworks, 
enforcing the payment of claims and fulfill-
ing the obligations in a timely manner.
13.  the management must develop detailed 
business plans, and specify performance cri-
teria and indicators.
14.  the managers of soEs must establish man-
agement information systems supporting 
decision-making processes. the managers 
of state-owned companies must establish 
internal control systems, and must take into 
account their indications when making deci-
sions and managing processes.
15.  the managers of soEs must ensure trans-
parent operation both to the owners and to 
the public, in addition to fulfilling their re-
porting obligations.
16.  the managers of soEs should only be al-
lowed to develop their social responsibil-
ity programmes subject to the owner’s ap-
proval, and should only be allowed to pursue 
any other, non-core activities under the same 
conditions.
17.  the managers of soEs should abide by the 
ethical and integrity principles of public 
service.
under the rule of law, the method for per-
forming public service is determined by legal 
regulations, therefore, public sector managers 
are primarily expected to comply with these 
rules. in addition, a manager must be able to 
adapt to the fast and challenging changes of the 
environment, therefore, public sector managers 
are increasingly expected to have innovation 
skills and an ability to promote risk manage-
ment and organisational learning.
good managers have up-to-date information 
on the operation of the company, on the special 
features and quality of its activities and proc-
esses, furthermore, they perform responsible 
management, behave ethically, abides by and 
causes others to abide by the rules, and ensures 
that the organisation entrusted to him operates 
effectively in the implementation of the required 
performance (streets should be clean, trains 
should arrive on time, drinking water should be 
healthy, etc.).
the management’s high level of integrity 
is indispensible, which might be supported by 
the recognition of the indications given by the 
internal control department, by transparent op-
eration, by minimising the interfaces affected 
by corruption risks and by respecting the ethical 
principles. of the players authorised to conduct 
auditing, the department for internal control has 
the possibility to monitor the regularity of the 
company’s operation most directly owing to its 
continuous presence within the organisation.
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7. tHE ROlE Of tHE 
StAtE AuDIt OffICE 
Of HunGARY In tHE 
REnEWAl Of PuBlIC 
SECtOR mAnAGEmEnt
in addition to the recommendations outlined in the previous section, the sao as the supreme 
guardian of public funds supports the develop-
ment of good governance by its audits, by shar-
ing its audit experiences, as well as by analysing 
and evaluating the same, and by consultation.
7.1 SAO Audits
the sao’s audits measure the aspects of regular functioning and performance to en-
sure that public funds are managed in an orderly, 
growth-stimulating fashion. since the adoption 
of the new sao act, an increasing emphasis 
has been laid on the auditing of the financial 
management of enterprises in majority state/lo-
cal government ownership (see figure 4). the 
audit findings provide help to the management 
of state-owned companies and for the processes 
of exercising ownership rights and to improving 
the regulatory system.
from the aspect of the renewal of public 
sector management, one of the most powerful 
instruments of the sao are recommendations 
requiring mandatory measures in its reports for 
the purposes of eliminating irregularities and 
shortcomings and promoting transparent and ef-
fective operation. the obligation to take meas-
ures and its related review by the sao provide 
considerable guarantee that the recommenda-
tions defined by the state audit office are in-
tegrated in the working practices of soEs by 
eliminating irregularities, shortcomings and in-
adequate practices detected in the management 
of the audited enterprises. the utilisation of the 
recommendations and the implementation of 
the action plans are checked by the sao in the 
form of follow-up audits. accordingly, based on 
its audit experiences and through recommen-
dations given to those concerned, the sao di-
rectly orientates the managers of soEs towards 
regular and appropriate operation, which at the 
same time forms the basis of sound and effec-
tive financial management. Nevertheless, we are 
convinced that the auditability of the manage-
ment of publicly owned companies by the sao 
itself has disciplinary and incentivising effects 
on those responsible for management duties.
in terms of the renewal of public sector man-
agement, the sao has developed focus ques-
tions based on its audit experiences that may 
serve as guidance in the future during the au-
diting soEs’ governance. accordingly, the sao 
aims to develop its audit practices in a direction, 
by which it can give appropriate recommenda-
tions to the renewed public sector management 
system supporting, as such, the regular and ef-
fective management of soEs.
7.2 Sharing of Good Practices 
and Consulting
the state audit office shares the audit experi-ences (tendencies detected, good practices) 
with those interested and the wider public. it has 
published studies and organised conferences for 
the purpose of promoting knowledge sharing.
the sharing of good practices promotes 
more regulated operation of the auditees, as well 
as the improvement of public finances. in ad-
dition, it supports potentially audited entities in 
compliant operation even if they have not been 
subject to an audit of the sao. the institution 
has organised several seminars focusing on sig-
nificant public funds-related topics in the past 
years, and continues to do so in the future. in 
one of the conferences of the series of seminars 
launched in 2010 under the title of “good Prac-
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tices – good Examples to be followed”17  held 
in september 2014, the sao provided informa-
tion to the managers of soEs and of the enti-
ties exercising proprietary rights on the sao’s 
experiences on asset management gained during 
the auditing of regional water distribution com-
panies. in a conference held in october 2015, 
the sao shared its experiences gained in rela-
tion to enterprises performing public functions 
with the managers of the affected public service 
companies and the related local governments 
exercising proprietary rights.
7.3 Contribution to 
lawmaking
Pursuant to the act on the state audit office, with its findings, recommendations and ad-
vice based on its audit experience, the sao as-
sists the national assembly, its committees and 
the work of the audited entities, thus facilitating 
well-governed state operations. the sao sup-
ports high-quality lawmaking at the three main 
levels of law hierarchy: at the levels of parlia-
mentary legislation, at the adoption of govern-
mental decrees and at the adoption of local gov-
ernment bylaws.
the sao strives to share its audit experi-
ences with legislators, so that those are utilised 
during lawmaking. Naturally, the sao does 
not wish to assume the tasks and responsibili-
ties of legislators, however, it is required to flag 
those high-risk, inadequately regulated or non-
regulated fields, the tackling of which is found 
reasonable by the legislators. a high-standard 
and coherent regulatory system that is free of 
legal gaps is particularly important for the sao, 
for if there are no rules or the regulations are 
incomplete, there are no criteria, against which 
regularity audits could be carried out, whereas 
in certain cases the irresponsible management 
of public funds would justify that those involved 
are held accountable (mészáros et al., 2016).
the warning letter is a legislator-supporting 
instrument in the hands of the sao, which also 
plays an important role in the renewal of public 
sector management. if the sao detects inad-
equate practice, risk management or omission 
of controls during its audits, it sends a warning 
letter to all those organisations that are reason-
ably required to learn about the related findings, 
in particular as regards the entities authorised to 
issue legislations.
the sao also supports the legislative proc-
esses aimed at renewing public sector manage-
ment by indirect means. for example, it forwards 
its reports, studies and analyses to the members 
of Parliament, to government members and to 
the bodies exercising proprietary rights (e.g. 
hungarian National asset management inc., 
ministries and local governments). in addition, 
by sharing its audit experiences, which raises 
public awareness, it encourages legislators to 
remedy the shortcomings and inadequate prac-
tices detected by making corresponding legis-
lations. the latest example of the effective and 
utilised support given to the legislative process 
is government Decision No. 1660/2015 (iX.15.) 
on the renewal of the remuneration system of 
the senior officers of business associations in 
majority state ownership adopted after the con-
sultation of the President of the sao.
7.4 Supporting of 
management trainings
in its resolution No. 34/2015 (Vii. 7.), the Na-tional assembly of hungary granted authorisa-
tion to the sao to widen its consulting activities 
regarding management systems and to support 
ethical management training of public managers. 
for the implementation of such authorisation, a 
17  Information can be found on the seminars organised since the launching of the series of seminars at the following website: http://www.asz.hu/
legjobb-gyakorlatok.
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joint department researching and teaching the 
measurement of public sector performance was 
established by an agreement signed by the state 
audit office and the university of miskolc (mE) 
on 10 November, 2015 (sao, 2015b). Within 
the framework of this cooperation, training pro-
grammes and modules will be developed for the 
managers and the young generation of managers 
of the organisations responsible for the manage-
ment of public funds and public assets, the key 
areas of which shall be as follows: performance 
assessment, measurement of the value of pub-
lic services, monitoring, controlling, human re-
sources management and the sharing of methods 
and instruments enhancing the integrity approach 
and integrity controls.
the sao and the mE intends to support 
“good governance” by the establishment of the 
department operating in budapest with a view to 
training public officials managing public funds 
soundly, effectively, expediently, transparently 
and ethically, thereby contributing as such to the 
improvement of public sector governance.
7.5 Enhancement of Integrity, 
Prevention of Corruption
the sao strived to understand and adopt the best international practice when, in coop-
eration with the Netherlands court of audit, 
it adapted to the hungarian environment the 
methodology applied in the Netherlands for the 
self-assessment of organisational integrity. the 
innovation of the hungarian adaptation is the 
fact that the evaluation of corruption risks and 
of the integrity controls protecting against them 
is performed in the context of a survey rather 
than in the form of self-assessment. the ques-
tionnaire of the survey is sent by the sao to 
thousands of public sector organisations simul-
taneously and the related responses are evalu-
ated by the sao. Within the framework of a 
project funded by the European union, the sao 
has requested institutions using public funds 
to complete a questionnaire every year since 
2011, which was filled in by as many as 2,557 
entities in 2015. the survey carried out by the 
sao measures the corruption risks and integri-
ty controls in the case of individual institutions 
by three indicators. the index values calculated 
for respondent institutions are published by the 
sao in the form of a digital map on its integrity 
website. the sao publishes annual summary 
evaluations on the results of the integrity survey 
and prepares analyses for each group of insti-
tutions, so that the institutions involved in the 
survey can obtain a reasonable picture on the 
level of their organisational integrity (Pulay et 
al., 2015a). one of the most important conclu-
sions of the integrity survey is that based on the 
results achieved, corruption-based vulnerability 
and the deployment of integrity controls dem-
onstrate positive correlations (Domokos and 
Pulay, 2015). moreover, the survey results can 
be used by the sao for risk analyses carried out 
for selecting audit topics and for the develop-
ment of audit methodology.
in relation to the renewal of public sector 
management, the sao developed a special in-
tegrity questionnaire for the soEs with a view 
to evaluating corruption risks associated with 
the legal status and activities of the companies 
and enhancing the related controls (Pulay et al., 
2015b). in January 2016, it was the first time 
that state-owned enterprises had the opportunity 
to complete the electronic questionnaire, on the 
basis of which these companies could obtain a 
“mirror image” of their integrity status, setting 
the grounds for developing more effective pro-
tection against corruption risks in the future. 
the sao has envisaged that as of the autumn of 
2016 it will involve enterprises owned by local 
governments in the process of integrity surveys, 
or in the long run it may even extend the scope 
to state vendors. the renewal of the integrity 
project may contribute to the development of 
an integrity-based management environment by 
those involved in the governance of soEs.
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8. SummARY AnD 
COnCluSIOnS
in our study we compared the recommenda-tions on the corporate governance of state-
owned enterprises available in the international 
literature with the effective national regulations 
and the actual practice depicted by the audits 
conducted by the state audit office of hun-
gary. We concluded that national regulations 
provide a corporate governance framework for 
state-owned enterprises that is in line with the 
international recommendations. however, the 
findings detected by the sao audits revealed 
that the management practices of state- and lo-
cal government-owned enterprises in several 
cases fail to comply with the legal provisions, 
or those involved in their governance fail to fill 
in the legal frameworks with substantive con-
tents incentivising for effective, efficient and 
transparent management. We established that 
the societal and economic importance of state-
owned enterprises, as well as the management-
related problems and shortcomings revealed 
by the sao audits necessitate the renewal of 
public management. in our study we have put 
forward suggestions, being in harmony with the 
recommendations of the international literature, 
by the implementation of which considerable 
improvement could be achieved in several, cur-
rently poorly functioning management areas that 
would further contribute to the establishment of 
an effectively, efficiently and expediently func-
tioning public management.
the experiences gained from sao audits 
have revealed that full compliance with the rules 
on the governance and operation of state-owned 
enterprises alone could induce considerable im-
provement in the management of public funds 
and public assets. the proposed renewal of the 
regulations related to the governance of soEs 
would only result in tangible improvement as far 
as effectiveness and efficiency are concerned, if 
the rules were fully observed by those affected.
it is general experience that orderliness is 
only achieved by those entities, where com-
pliance is regularly inspected. the renewal of 
the regulations on the corporate governance of 
soEs, and the increasing financial resources 
and possibilities provided by the expanding 
economic environment shall be to no avail, if 
the governance and operation of state-owned 
enterprises would not be audited regularly and 
the findings of such audits are not subjected to 
any consequences.
as the construction of the defence lines 
makes a fortress resistant, so will multilevel au-
dits promote law-abiding behaviour. according-
ly, it is important in terms of the management of 
soEs that as many control mechanisms should 
be integrated as possible, and that the internal 
control, the management audits, the supervi-
sory board, the auditor, the ownership entity, 
the government audit office and the state au-
dit office of hungary, as supreme guardian of 
public funds, should all apply and enforce their 
audit-related authorities.
the renewal of the corporate governance of 
soEs, accompanied by its consistent enforce-
ment and control may contribute to the estab-
lishment of a well-functioning public manage-
ment serving and enhancing the public good.
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